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NORTHERNERS COUNTING BLACK ELEPHANTS:
ON SAFARI WITH LIVE 8 AND G 8

ABSTRACT
Purpose – To demonstrate the inadequacy of traditional concepts of accountability
and corporate governance for global gifting relationships, as exemplified in the Live 8
and G 8 events. An alternative construct of value in exchange is proposed.
Design / Methodology / Approach – A discussion paper using a literature based
analysis and critique.
Findings – Accounting avoids social responsibility by denying culturally determined
legitimate meanings of value other than those constructed from an economic
perspective. New accountability and corporate governance mechanisms are needed for
donor/recipient relationships.
Research limitatations / Implications – The arguments advanced should be further
explored in alternate empirical instances, and examined in alternate cultural contexts
to give a greater depth of understanding.
Originality/ value - The paper calls into question the adequacy of accountability
concepts in a globalized environment. The paper is a unique contribution to the
literature in is application of gifting theory and Baudrillard’s theory of simulacra to
not for profit and public sector institutions.
Keywords – accountability, corporate governance, G 8, gifting, Live 8, simulacra.
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1. Introduction
An examination of two political events, the Live 8 concert held on 2 July 2005 and its
associated MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY[1] movement, and the G 8 summit held at
Gleneagles, Scotland in the United Kingdom on 6 July 2005, both of which made
attempts to rectify the injustice of poverty in Africa, provide a poignant narrative from
which to demonstrate the inadequacy of accountability and corporate governance
concepts in affecting justice in global wealth distribution. These two events are an
extreme manifestation of the moral geography of the Northern vox populi pitted
against the globalization of markets manifesto of the G 8 machine, both of which
rhetorically claim as their mission the elimination of poverty through a just allocation
of resources globally. Much consternation of the two events was forthcoming around
the remoteness of the events both geographically and culturally from the forty seven
countries comprising the African continent [2]. Both the 2005 Live 8 concert and G 8
summit are recognized as momentous high impact events which attempted to
transform wealth distribution. However, both attracted criticism from their intended
recipients. African leaders said that the concerts were a pointless exercise, while aid
groups working in Africa claimed the effort was misguided and a gimmick (Epstein
2005). Comments directed at both events by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni
stated “Those Northerners in suits could do some good if they understood the issues
well. I have heard recently they have been talking of aid. They are talking of debt
forgiveness. These are short-term palliatives, short-term painkillers. The real
medicine is trade access, to open up their markets for our products” (Epstein 2005).
Sibuele Sibaca, a then 21 year old South African stated “The whole of the world sees
Africa as this basket case… We want the whole world to know that we want to be part
of the solution” (Burkeman 2005).
The discourse emanating from these comments on debt forgiveness, resource
allocation and trade access is couched in concepts of accounting and accountability.
The Australian Statement of Accounting Concepts (SAC) 2 Objective of General
Purpose Financial Reporting (CPA Australia 2007), demonstrates that both historical
and contemporary views of accounting use the rhetoric of its role as enabling an
efficient and effective allocation of scarce resources. Bryer (1997) argues that double
entry bookkeeping was associated with specific risks in evaluating assets and
liabilities, as part of capital accumulation and resource allocation. The double entry
calculus, when representing debt, requires reciprocity from its recipient be recorded.
That is, a debtor is represented as an asset in the books of the creditor, and repayment
or reciprocity is assumed in full. Only economic aspects of the debtor creditor
relationship are represented. This is problematic for gifting relationships such as debt
forgiveness, as is demonstrated in this paper.
What is now known as the G 8 was first formed in November 1975 in Rambouillet
France. The heads of state or government of the then six founder countries met,
identifying themselves as major industrial democracies and in doing so inferring a
moral imperative. Now the G 8 is a group of eight advanced industrial nations, whose
heads of government meet annually, and their representatives known as “sherpas”
meet more often, to discuss what they define as important economic, financial and
political issues. The group currently comprises as full members the United States of
America, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Canada and Russia.
The Live 8 organisation on 2 July 2005 held a series of ten simultaneous concerts
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across the continents of the G 8 nations and South Africa, organised by Sir Bob
Geldof. Tickets were distributed free of charge by phone ballot (Coates 2005), and
over one thousand musicians performed without fee. For the first time such an event
did not have as its objective to raise money, but to raise political awareness and
influence corporate agendas and the agenda of the G 8. The event was facilitated by
numerous corporate “partners” or sponsors including the major sponsors Volvo, AOL,
Times Warner, various telephone companies, and Coca Cola. The concerts were
broadcast across 182 television networks and two thousand radio stations. These
concerts preceded the conference and summit of the G 8 at Gleneagles Hotel,
Perthshire Scotland on 6-8 July 2005. The concerts were also timed to coincide with
two events, first the 20 year anniversary of Live Aid [3], and secondly to run parallel
with the United Kingdom’s MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY campaign and the
associated “freedom march” called The Long Walk to Justice, also held on 2 July
2005. Both events would not have been possible without the cooperation of the global
corporate sector, for whom the events afforded the opportunity to align their images
with the ideas of democracy and economic freedom. These events too are
conceptually unified by a subtext of the measurement and allocation of scarce
resources, and accountability to aid agendas and for aid disbursements.
Accordingly, why, in such a crucial debate about solving the allocation of scarce
resources to Africa where the very real consequences of failure are starved peoples, is
the accounting profession and corporate governance academy quiet if accounting
itself claims expertise in informing decisions about the measuring and allocation of
scarce resources? On the other side of the same coin, why did the general public who
were very visibly mobilized into action around these events, not seek the knowledge
and skills of the accounting profession in advancing their arguments in either the
political or economic arena? These questions are all the more in need of an answer
given acceptance of the critical accounting community’s view that accounting is more
than a calculative practice and accounting is value-laden, self interested and has a
socially constructing element (Tinker et al, 1982; Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988,
Hines, 1988). From this perspective, accounting as a measurement device can be
construed as complicit in this atrocity of resource misallocation that has led to the
abject poverty of many of the citizens of the African continent. Both events call into
question the adequacy of accountability concepts in a globalized environment as they
affect global wealth distribution.
This paper demonstrates that accountability is constructed from the position of
advanced capitalist stages of exchange, and this is inadequate to impartially represent
and mediate gifting relationships between advanced and emerging economic states.
Such a use of accounting and its constructs of accountability disadvantage the “other”
emerging African states (Broadbent, J. 1995) and privilege the political practices of
advanced economic states and organizations such as the Live 8 and G 8 events.
Current financial accountability has developed for relationships established as a result
of market exchanges. It is domiciled in axioms of the private sector and mature
capitalist market mechanisms. This paper argues in an era of globalization where
private corporations implode into the previously demarcated areas of public sector,
not for profit bodies, and lesser developed markets, accountability premised on
exchange theory and market economics is limited and potentially harmful. It is
argued that applying private sector accountability unquestioningly to gifting
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organizations such as Live 8 and G 8 leads to simulacra of accountability rather than
an authentic engagement.

The second section of this paper describes the theoretical framework of Baudrillard’s
stages of simulacra, the theoretical lens used in the paper. The third section will apply
this lens to historical developments in concepts of accountability to demonstrate the
path of a “Northern”[4] construct of accountability as simulacra to its most advanced
stage. The fourth section will analyze accountability in the North, describing the
consequences of Northern interactions with African States associated with the Live 8
and G 8 phenomena. In the fifth section an alternate view of gifting to explain
accountability relationships is proposed. The sixth section draws conclusions,
describing the alternative nature of the accountability that would result from using
gifting theory, and its transformation from “Northern” constructs by advanced
capitalist states.
2. Theoretical Development
It is proposed that although overtly silent, accounting and accountability is covertly
present as an active ideologically biased constituent, privileging economic equivalent
exchanges rather than gifting exchanges characterized by disequilibrium in
reciprocity. The theoretical lens of Baudrillard’s simulacra is used to argue that
notions of accountability are derived both historically and from economic exchange
theory, and operate as hyper-real simulacra for good accountability in geopolitically
diverse moral geographies. Mechanisms of accountability are believed by the masses
and gifting communities as valid, and are promoted by the media and are used by
institutions.
In this way accountability for organizational relationships involved in providing aid
has aligned itself ideologically with existing dominant societal structures of the North.
It is argued that emancipation and advancement of accountability beyond the capital
dominating private sector comes from challenging the universality of prevailing
market belief systems. This theoretical approach is sympathetic with the view of
Cooper et al. (2005) who argue that any form of social responsibility accounting, to
have impact, needs to be produced outside the mechanisms of the market, be
theoretically informed, and be linked to social struggles and groups. The postmodern
simulacra concept offers an alternate lens, and also alternate to the Marxist lens
offered by Cooper et al (2005).
Arrington and Watkins (2002) argue for the necessity to explain political engagement
with accountability through alternative ontological and epistemological stances. In
doing so, this paper contributes to the extant accounting literature that uses a
Baudrillardian framework, and builds on a theme of examining accountability as
simulacra. The application of the Baudrillardian framework has been used in the work
of Macintosh et al (2000), Takatera and Sawabe (2000), Baker (2002), and Vollmer
(2003). Such a theoretical approach was advocated by Macintosh et al. (2000, p45)
who claim “much more in Baudrillard’s corpus of literature could be tapped for
further understanding of accounting and the issues facing standard setters”. This
paper applies Baudrillard’s concept of simulacra to accountability mechanisms of
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public policy and corporate governance associated with gifting and aid relationships
as exemplified in the Live 8 and G 8 events of 2005 and their aftermath.
While the limitations of using a post modern framework in accounting studies are
acknowledged (Cooper 1997, Arnold 1998, Mattessich 2003) this paper argues that
using a theoretical framework that is not derived from neoclassical market
mechanisms and that incorporates sensitivity to the political and media environment
offers valuable analysis to advance theoretical understandings of accountability.
Furthermore, it permits an interrogation of current notions of accountability for public
policy, advancing the work called for by Roslender and Dillard (2003).
In Baudrillard’s work on systems of representation or signs he sees consumption
rather than production as a basis of social order. As discussed below he argues that
the meaning given to a sign is self referential and is derived by what the sign does not
mean. Each sign has both a signifier such as an image, sound, or a word, and
something signified that is its concept or meaning. For example a swimming pool
denotes its use as an object, for swimming as exercise or recreation. The swimming
pool connotes a degree of functionalism, wealth, prestige or comfort. The ownership
(consumption) of a swimming pool implies a place in a wider social order (Horrocks
and Jevtic 1999). The swimming pool is an object which circulates in society as
meanings. In this way Baudrillard sees reality as being constituted by signs found in
the use of language and text (for example corporate reports). He also proposes that
objects and their signs such as associated values and events are constituted historically
and discursively (Macintosh et al 2000).
Baudrillard goes on to argue that it is consumption of image that causes objects to be
organised and differentiated as signs. Recognising that in capitalist societies all
objects are given a value in exchange, Baudrillard added that they are also given in
advanced capitalist markets, a symbolic value. A prestige car has both a value in
exchange and a status or social distinction. It is the social role that the object plays
that gives it a sign value. In this way Baudrillard sees signs as accomplices of
capitalism. He argues that capital accumulates until it becomes image, and images
mediate social relationships among people. Consumption is a new phase of capitalism
for the affluent society. Objects are not just consumed for their function, but rather
for their collective meaning as determined by a calculus or network of signs
(Horrocks and Jevtic 1999).
Further, Baudrillard proposes that the use of symbols and images as signs of reality
has had a progression in history, which he terms orders of simulacra. Baudrillard’s
orders of simulacra chart a progression of the use of signs in language and text in
society. Baudrillard argues that these signs first represented, then dominated and then
replaced the societal objects that they represent.
Signs move from being
unproblematic to being “counterfeit” to “masking the absence of a basic reality”
(Horrocks and Jevtic 1999, pp106-107). In a post modern culture dominated by
media, it is argued all we have are simulations which aren’t any more or less real than
a reality they simulate.
The symbolic order or feudal era of simulacra is the most simplistic, where a sign or
image is the reflection of a basic reality. This is a “good appearance” in its
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truthfulness and transparency in representation. Society is organised with signs in a
fixed order according to social position, e.g. a peasant could not become a King
(Mann 2005). Ontologically there is an independent objective reality.
Secondly follows the “first order of simulacra” also called the counterfeit era. In this
era a sign or image masks and distorts a basic reality, this being an “evil appearance”,
because the image, rather than being true is distorted and “perverts” or undermines
communicating the quality of the reality. Fakes or copies circulate at the same time as
original objects. These fakes hope to transcend or set up as a utopian ideal the
original.
Following is the production era called the second order of simulacra, or the order of
sorcery. In this era the sign or image masks the absence of a basic reality. In this
phase the sign is a form of smoke and mirrors, attempting to hide the true reality. It
gives the appearance of a reality that is absent, and manufactures an appearance of
reality. Objects produced are not counterfeits but are just many copies that are
indistinguishable from their original prototype.
The fourth era termed the third order of simulacra bears no relation to reality and is
simulacrum, where the image precedes the reality, and its existence does not resemble
any reality. It is pure simulation (Baudrillard 1988). Simulations have no original or
prototype (think of the computer generated images in movies). These simulations of
reality are termed hyper-reality, and information replaces objects as a basis of
production (Mann 2005). Hyper-reality occurs when the image or the model
anticipates and precedes the reality, and has no real referent but is completely
detached (Macintosh et al 2000). Reality no longer has to be rational “since it is no
longer measured against some ideal or negative instance” (Baudrillard 1988). It
substitutes signs of the real for the real itself. Simulation threatens the difference
between reality and imaginary. A state of hyper-reality exists where the image of the
sign appears independent of any underpinning reality (Baudrillard 1981, 1983;
McGoun 1997; Macintosh et al., 2000; Baker 2002).
Implosion occurs when the distinctions between the differing orders of simulacra
become ambiguous. Implosion is inevitable when the boundaries between two ideas
or concepts or images become blurred or collapse so that any differences between the
two are no longer apparent.
The object accountability as a sign in society has developed over time. Earlier
constructs denoted probity, and a calculative practice of reckoning, the management
of resources held in trust, and legitimization. The development of limited liability
saw accountability as being symbolic of a social capital (Bryer 1997). Today the
object accountability connotes a relationship of privileged power of one party over
another, status (lower if you are the accountability giver, higher if you are the
accountability recipient), wealth and decision making power in society.
Accountability in global public policy is an object of consumption with a value in
exchange and a symbolic value. Those with perceived accountability have greater
access to international trade (accountability’s value in exchange) and have a symbolic
value of democratization.
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3. A Baudrillardian Analysis of Historical Developments of Accountability.
While the North is acknowledged as being comprised of advanced capitalist states, not
all African states have reached this stage of economic development. This is
significant because differing stages are characterized by different symbols of
accountability. While it is not the intention of this section to provide a comprehensive
overview of the development of accountability in the North, watershed stages are
identified to demonstrate the development of the symbolic value of accountability
alongside economic development. This section discusses the implications of
developments in accountability for social capital and for the entity. Developments
discussed are the emergence of token systems, the concept of stewardship, the idea of
trading beyond subsistence and for profit, the transition from feudalism to capitalism,
the concept of limited liability and the concept of accountability to gain legitimacy.
This is done to demonstrate stages of the symbolic value of accountability, leading to
the now hyper-reality of accountability in advanced capitalist states. A subsequent
section will discuss the implications of this for the African situation.
3.1 Token Systems
Schmandt-Besserat (1981) recorded and interpreted the finding of clay tokens dating
from 8000 BC at ancient Near and Middle Eastern archaeological sites as early forms
of accounting and pre-cursors of modern day writing and numeracy. The work of
Schmandt-Besserat links accounting through a progressively more complex token
system with the evolution of society from an agricultural or subsistence basis to urban
formation and settlement. Schmandt-Besserat believes that increasingly sophisticated
accounting was related to the emergence of an elite society controlling the economy
of wealth redistribution within increasingly larger communities. Evidence of this,
according to Schmandt-Besserat, is three-fold. First a token system was not found in
one early Syrian community until it had grown from a small compound to a village
some 5 or 6 times its original size. Schmandt-Besserat has surmised that, based on
evidence at the site, the emergence of the token system coincided with the evolution
of society from an egalitarian community to a structured society including city-states
and the use of bureaucracy and administrative processes to oversee the accumulation
and use of community resources. Secondly, the increasing complexity of tokens has
also been taken as evidence that tokens did not represent property such as sheep or
grain but were means of counting such items. Thirdly, the finding of tokens at
elaborate burial sites only, adds further weight to the view of a class system where
tokens were the province of wealthy and elite members of society.
With the growth in the use of tokens, an increasing sophistication of accounting and
accountability was needed. There was an evolution from a small egalitarian
community to a structured society. The implications of this for social capital were the
beginnings of administrative processes to control the use of community resources via
the use of tokens. This brought with it implications for the entity concept in terms of
individuals’ access to scarce resources being distinct from community access. Tokens
indicated items of ownership and facilitated the formation of a class system of
wealthy elite. The tokens had both a value in exchange and a symbolic value in a
class system. Applying Baudrillard’s orders of simulacra, we identify the symbolic
value of the tokens as being of the feudal era or “good” appearance of a basic reality.
The tokens were a primitive form of symbolic value, representative of a fixed social
order developed over time.
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3.2 Stewardship
According to Chen (1975) the religious basis of stewardship was premised on the
belief that all things were created by God for use by all humans. If ownership of
things and property was required in order to use them, then the human owner must use
those property rights to satisfy the needs of society as a whole (Chen 1975, p.534).
Chen further argued that social responsibility was the primary stewardship function
because the “owner of the property” was the steward of God (p.535). Such an early
view is embracing of a moral geography, and reciprocity in exchange was not
expected to be equivalent, nor assumed to be satisfied in financial terms only.
Stewardship was an accountability of the human owner to God and to the whole of
society. This is a much broader concept of accountability than a mere financial
accountability. The stewardship view of accountability is symbolic of a fixed divine
social order, and aligns itself with the symbolic or feudal era, portraying an honest or
good appearance of a fixed social order.
3.3 Trade for Profit
With the spread and development of capital where trade was for profit as opposed to
subsistence, a survival of the fittest mentality emerged along with a concomitant
erosion of the social responsibility aspect of stewardship. In other words, managers
were primarily morally responsible to owners of business entities rather than to
society at large (Chen 1975 p.537). Such a shift narrowed the focus of accountability
from a societal view to an entity view, with accountability being initiated and
restricted primarily to economic exchanges. The symbolic value of accountability in
this circumstance aligns itself with Baudrillard’s first order of simulacra, or
counterfeit era. The purer symbolism of stewardship is distorted from its reality, with
the substitution of the owners of business as recipients of accountability symbols are a
fake appearance or a perverted representation of a broader view of capital to benefit
society. The owners of business proxy in a distorted way being representative of the
interests of broader society.
3.4 Transition from feudalism to capitalism
Social responsibility again became an aspect of stewardship with the expansion of
business and an increase in the size of business organisations (Chen 1975 p.538). As
business entities became larger and more complex, management not only had more
power, but more responsibility in that decisions not only impacted on owners, but
employees, suppliers, customers and society in general (Chen 1975 p.539). However,
such accountability originated in an economic exchange of equivalence, with the
underlying assumption that a financial representation of accountability is adequate for
society. Such an assumption must be questioned as an adequate form of
accountability for global aid relationships, given the allocation of billions of dollars in
aid to Africa and the fact that poverty has increased. Such circumstances proffer that
there has not been an efficient allocation of resources, that is to say, there has been a
failure of corporate governance and accountability within the global village.
In the same manner, the historical origins and evolution of tokens and money and the
parallel developments of accounting and market complexity can be seen to dismantle
the stewardship ideals as described by Chen (1975) of a moral duty to God to create
social justice in distributing scarce resources in society. The use of tokens (money)
and its artefact inscriptions (accounting) developed over time as a technology
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demanding equivalence in exchanges, drawing those who had command over scarce
resources away from an altruistic notion of stewardship.
3.5 Limited Liability
Bryer (2000 a, p.141) and Chiapello (2007, p.275) argue “as capital becomes
increasingly socialised, accounting practices evolve progressively, in accordance with
Marx’s theory, and double entry bookkeeping not only finally becomes the dominant
model, much more importantly is associated with very specific risks for valuing assets
and liabilities, so that capitalist profit can be calculated” (Chiapello 2007, p.275). A
watershed moment in the development of the concept of accountability was the
introduction of limited liability. The 1855 amendment to the United Kingdom Joint
Stock Companies Act of 1844 made limited liability widely available. This followed
the inquiry of the Mercantile Laws Commission of 1854 (Bryer 1997). The
introduction of limited liability meant that the onus of accountability was imposed on
a separate independent legal entity created by the abstraction of capital by
incorporation (Bryer 1997, p.37).
Bryer (1997, p.38) argues that limited liability created a vision for social capital that
allowed an “enfranchisement of capital”, facilitating a right of association and
competition on equal terms or freedom of contract with capital. Bryers (1997) argues
that this approach is in sympathy with Marx’s critique and development of the views
of Adam Smith. Capital was made “social” by middle classes pooling it in joint stock
companies and appointing control to managers, believing this gave an equal return for
equal capital. In this way limited liability was seen as an attempt to embrace a vision
of social capital.
The symbolic accountability attached to limited liability aligns itself with the third
order of simulacra or hyper-reality. The existence of the corporate entity does not
resemble any reality. Rather, its image as an artificial person has no real referent.
The abstraction of accountability given by the corporate form anticipates
accountability by a large number of individual investors.
3.6 Accountability to gain legitimacy
Carruthers and Espleland (1991) as cited in Chiapello (2007, p. 272) argue that
accountability is offered to obtain legitimacy. They suggest prior to the 15th century
external accountability was not generally required as there was no capitalistic
mentality, and so there was little need for legitimacy from society. The 15th and 16th
centuries saw the rise of double entry bookkeeping in the North, as part of the
developments of the Renaissance. In keeping with the sensibilities of the Renaissance,
the balancing of debits with credits gave legitimacy from the Aristotelian idea of
balance. The rise of double entry gave the image of rationality, and suggested that
reference to God was not needed for the legitimacy of accounts as was done
previously. However, this relied on the numeracy and literacy skills of the users of
the accounts. This approach demonstrates the production era or “order of sorcery” of
simulacra, because the accounts try to give the appearance of a reality that is absent,
that is, give the appearance of a rational economic representation of a process that also
embodies non-rational elements, intrinsic in human nature and decision making.
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The watershed developments discussed in this section raise a moral issue of the
accountability of the individual investors being limited to their investment.
Consistent with Bryer (1997) and Chiapello (2007) the accountability is restricted to
economic terms and the creation of profit. This raises the question what societal
artefacts (tokens) of accountability are in evidence in the allocation of scarce
resources in Africa today? All the above developments are related to capitalism and
ignore non-economic constructs of accountability characteristic of lesser developed
economies and alternate cultural settings.
4. Northern accountability and its consequences for Africa.
A Northern notion of accountability for invested capital has embedded in it multiple
orders of simulacra incumbent upon quantitative symbols of an advanced capitalist
position. These are unsympathetic with the alternate symbols of accountability
present in an emerging market. Consequently a vacuum emerges making equivalence
in transactions meaningless, but instigating a position of implied reciprocity, that is a
simulacrum of reciprocity. In these aid relations there is an interaction of advanced
capitalist societies with less advanced capitalist societies, creating a crisis of
stewardship from the mismatch of accountability needs at different capitalist stages
and from differing cultural symbolic meanings construed. Funding pledges and their
attached accountability requirements demonstrate the intrinsic complicity of
accountability mechanisms in an ideologically biased consumption of accountability
symbols.
The cynical catch phrase of the MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY movement: “two, four,
six, eight must we really accumulate?” is anathema to both accounting and capitalism
as it seeks engagement beyond the solely economic, and is more akin to a broad
stewardship view of accountability. As an institutional structure situated in an
advanced capitalist state, the movement itself risks being compromised as does the
public interest precept of accounting given its geopolitical privileging of an economic
elite. From this perspective Live 8 and G 8 reinforce the imperative to prioritise
accounting for the public interest. This, however, is problematic.
Identifying the public interest has always been controversial.
In an era of
globalisation and structured societies presenting new levels of complexity it is
problematized even further when it has to be determined who is the public? (Cooper
et al. 2005). Given advanced technologies, communications and globalized trade
alongside very underdeveloped economies, education and technologies in Africa, is
accountability at an entity level or organisational level relevant or sufficient?
Ontologically, how can an axiomatic normative framework of accountability
legitimately operate when it must serve more than one public interest and so
competing interests? Are these public interests competing chronologically or do new
technologies make redundant concepts of periods of accountability?
Donated monies are accounted for in the same way as invested capital under Northern
constructs of accountability because accounts of how donated monies are used is
usually construed to be given by the recipients to the donors. This relationship
privileges the donors and uses the economic rationalist metaphor of them being the
owners of capital. When donors in such a relationship are corporations, they must act
in the Northern sense of corporate accountability, privileging the capital providers
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above public interest. However, there is ample evidence that this approach has not
worked to date. The discussion following illustrates the failure of Northern
accountability in Africa, in terms of the relationship between corruption and the
persistence of poverty in Africa.
The general consensus among African development analysts is that foreign aid to
Africa has not been effective. For example, between 1980 and 1988, sub-Saharan
Africa received $83 billion in aid. Yet all that aid failed to spur economic growth,
arrest Africa’s economic atrophy, or promote democracy. Ayittey (1999) reported in
testimony before the US House Sub-Committee on Africa that
The statistics on Africa’s postcolonial development record are horrifying. In
1985 more than 100 million of Africa’s 700 million people lived in abject
poverty. This number rose to 216 million in 1990 and is projected to reach 304
million by the year 2000. …
Four months before Live 8 and G 8, McAllister et al (2005) reported on European
initiatives to alleviate poverty in Africa including those prompted by Sir Bob Geldof
of Live 8 in consultation with UK Prime Minister and G 8 representative, Tony Blair.
The failure of previous attempts to fight poverty in Africa was specifically addressed
in the paper. For example
… billions of dollars of aid have been ploughed into Africa
over the past few decades without reversing its decline …One
prod to action will come from a U.N. conference in
September that's supposed to figure out why progress toward
the Millennium Development Goals - some simple measures
of success in fighting poverty - has been so lousy. In 2000,
nearly every country in the world signed up to meet the goals
in 2015, but not much has happened since.
Ellis (2007) also argued that poverty, especially in underdeveloped countries, has
been an international concern since the formation of the United Nations. In spite of
more than 50 years of ‘concern’, little has been achieved.
A recurring theme in the literature has been corruption. An implicit assumption
embedded in the concept of corruption is indebtedness. At the crux of narratives on
corruption is different cultural understandings, visibilities and expectations of
indebtedness. Roitman (2003) argues that debt is the absence of wealth or a
mediating device in societies for not having enough. The debt itself represents a
social relationship. Roitman (2003) argues that this relationship is more than a
functionalist one, and is a means of affirming or denying sociability.
Richards et al. referred to “the human psychology of ‘lootocracy’ (government by
fraudsters) – its insatiable greed content and the instincts to protect both the loot and
its sources” and argued that it was the source of corruption in the African sub-region
of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). According to Richards et al. (p.308)
It is public knowledge that public servants, including military
officers, serving and retired (who held sway in much of SAA
in the last three decades), are richer than their countries – their
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sources of wealth traceable only to the fact that they held
public office at one point or the other (Ayittey, 1999). Almost
always the fruits of these corrupt enrichments are stashed
away in foreign bank accounts in the developed world.
Ayittey (1999), Richards et al (2003) and Ellis (2007) all demonstrate that corruption
in the form of cronyism, nepotism and personal enrichment through the redirection of
the proceeds of foreign aid and loans to personal bank accounts on the part of
government leaders and elites have been well known for decades but effectively
ignored by the providers of aid and loans. Richards et al (2003, citing the World
Bank, 2001) provide the example of Mobuto Sese Seku who raised some $12 billion
in foreign debt in the name of the Republic of Congo (formerly, Zaire). More than $4
billion was redirected to Mobuto’s personal accounts leaving “the people of … a
once-wealthy country, … pauperized” (Ayittey, 1999). Of equal concern is the waste
of foreign aid and loans on projects that sound good in principal but of little or no
benefit to the recipients.
Furthermore, Ayittey (1999) cites instances of the commitment of foreign aid and
loans to “black elephants” (grandiose projects) or projects without economic benefit
to the regions to which funds were allocated. The “black elephants” included
“basilicas, grandiose monuments, grand conference halls, and show airports” (Ayittey
1999). Other foreign aid “blunders” cited by Ayittey (1999) include silos built in
remote locations not visited by peasant farmers (US aid to Senegal), a fully-automated
modern bakery without flour with which to bake bread (Canada aid to Tanzania), a
banana-boxing plant where the break-even production point exceeded the output of
bananas (Italy aid to Somalia), and a fish-freezing plant in a country where goats were
raised (Norwegian aid to Turkana).
Such examples come from the power of donors to specify the use and terms of the
gifts which are embedded with donor expectations, values, economic motivations and
cultural premises. Accountability needs to move away from donor domination of
accountability requirements as a moral imperative. This demands radical social
change outside existing market and political structures (Dillard 1991). The following
section proposes the alternate framework of gifting theory as informing an
accountability framework outside an economic rationalist view.
5. The idea of the gift.
A gifting relationship is established when something in it or of it cannot be
reciprocated or paid back. Reciprocity is not essential when a gift is given, such as is
the case of a blood donor (Boundas 2001). This is very different to the concept of an
exchange or economic transaction. An economic transaction implies equivalence,
equilibrium, and reciprocity. In an economic transaction something is given in
anticipation of receiving something, for example labour for wages. Such an exchange
does not have to be simultaneous but can occur over time and involve more than one
person. This is different to a gift because a gift can never be a zero sum game
(Boundas 2001).
In an era of globalization accounting and technology when combined, facilitate an
immediate distance relationship between donors and recipients, in which donors are
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remote from the recipient(s) of their donation and from the consequences of their
donations at work. Accountability systems that are used by the donors and imposed
on the recipients of the donations allow a reductionism of the gifting relationship to an
economic representation, and provide anonymity and distance for the donor.
Responsibilities for gifting relationships are subjugated to financial accountability
with a premise of reciprocity in the form of accountability and good governance. This
results in an enforced privileging of capitalist concepts of exchange that are embedded
in the accounting and accountability calculus over social concepts of giving and the
gift. In this way morality in giving is subjugated to a rationalist system of
representation. Systems of accounting and accountability, while only able to capture
a financial relationship, are substituted as adequate symbolic representations of more
complex social gifting relationships.
Boundas (2001) argues that theories of the gift are often confused with theories of
exchange. Explanations of exchange from economic rationalist perspectives demand
equivalence in the exchange, as is demonstrated in the equilibrium point of supply and
demand. For example, positive accounting theory’s explanation for the presence of
accounting standards is that the number and nature of what accounting standards are
supplied are the result of a market demand for accounting regulation (Watts and
Zimmerman 1990). The seller exchanges a commodity for something of equivalent
value. This functionalist view has several underpinning assumptions, that individuals
are fully informed when establishing the value of the item(s) exchanged. Individuals
are assumed to be utility maximizers, and individuals meet in the exchange on an
equal basis in a stable environment (Watts and Zimmerman 1990). Traders are utility
maximizes where it is assumed that the market price captures all relevant aspects of
exchange.
This is juxtaposed against the idea of a gift, which relies on disequilibrium in
exchange. The assumptions of economic exchange do not hold in a gifting
relationship. Ideally, a pure gift occurs when individuals give anonymously where
there is no possibility for reciprocity from the recipient. One very close example to
this is blood donations. Silk (2004) argues that the purest form of the gift is
unattainable, for example even blood donors have a low level expectation of
reciprocity in anticipating blood products will be available for them if it is needed.
Derrida (1992) argues that the idea of an altruistic gift assumes a free will and not
causality.
It is the identity and values of the owner embedded in the gift (making a gift more
than a commodity in exchange) that creates and inscribes a moral geography between
donor and recipient (Silk 2004). In the case of Live 8 and the G 8 this encompasses
aid relationships connecting donors in the North with recipients, in these examples, in
the African states. The ontological assumption underlying these relationships is
universalism as compunction for moral motivation. The assumption is altruistic. All
humans are entitled to justice in all forms, including economic rights. Silk argues
“secular organizations can trace their inspirations for caring back to Enlightenment
humanism. This is different to nearest and dearest caring because it is between
stranger relationships where donor and carer never meet. This is universalism as a
basis for moral motivation” (Silk 2004, p.231).
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Boundas (2001) suggests that most gifting is less than its purest ultraistic form,
proposing gifting theory assumes that people give because they expect to receive and
that people return the gift because they fear others will stop giving. Unlike advanced
market exchanges, the whole function optimally operates in a state of disequilibrium.
A gift donor relies on the recipient being in debt for the reciprocity. If this is paid
back in equivalent value there is no longer a gifting relationship, and so the social
relationship unravels and consequently no longer exists (Boundas 2001). Gifts where
the donor is dominant in a relationship require lower levels of reciprocity than
economic exchange. However, there is often rhetoric of partnership and participation
(Silk 2004). This is evident in the following statement from a G 8 document at the
2005 summit which states “the fundamental aim of the plan is to mobilize technical
and financial assistance so that, by 2010, African partners are able to act more
effectively to prevent and resolve violent conflict on the continent, and undertake
peace support operations in accordance with the United Nations Charter” (Chapter 1,
paragraph 11, G 8 Progress report 2005).
Deleuze and Guattari (1977) argue that the circulation of gifts with an expectation of
lower levels of reciprocity form the basis of societies that are not advanced capitalist
markets. Such a relationship Deleuze and Guattarie argue is neither based on any
value in exchange nor any value in use. Rather, any exchange is valued by both
parties as a calculation of risk in crossing the limit of expected reciprocity. For
example, if recipients do not reciprocate with adequate accountability and governance
as defined by the donor, the gifting relationship will cease. However, if equivalent
accountability and corporate governance capability is achieved, the gifting
relationship is no longer needed. While commodities can be exchanged, a gift
subsumes the identity of the giver.
Bourdieu (as cited in Silk 2004, p.234) argues that gifts have a political dimension,
where any expressions of concern, or acts of generosity that cannot be repaid set up a
permanent asymmetry. Such caring from a distance makes use of intermediaries.
Such intermediaries as Live 8, G 8 and MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY institutionalize
and perpetuate an asymmetry between the recipients in African states and the donors
in the North. Silk argues donor domination means that the donors and their
intermediaries have power to specify the use and terms of gifted resources. This
includes control over forms of accountability (Silk 2004, p.235).
Integral to a gifting relationship, neither the gift itself is reciprocated equally, nor is
any donor accountability or donor legitimacy. “Motivations derived from commercial
and political interests predominate…(aid) has been used to further a new liberal
agenda of deregulation allied with a drive for improved governance and moves
towards the political model of Western liberal democracy” (Silk 2004, p.236). In
such relationships the rules and institutional frameworks favour private financial
interests that cannot share reciprocity of accountability to the public interest. This
causes the perpetuation of the asymmetry. An example of this is contracts that must
be placed with firms located in donor countries, termed “boomerang aid”. A further
example is the acknowledge politicization and economic consequences of accounting
standards (Rappaport 1977, Zeff 1978).
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Similarly, Silk (2004) argues that cultural and economic difference offer a critique of
the ontological assumption of universalism used to explain gifting. Cultural and
economic differences also challenge the ontological singularity of economic
rationalism in economic exchanges. Silk (2004) questions whether caring should be
based on the similarities or differences between persons? His point is that universal
values are axiomatic and normative and as such are determined by the powerful. This
is problematic, because as is the case in the Live 8 and G 8 circumstance, they impose
Northern values. Universalism subjugates indigenous constructions of value.
Universalism becomes a representation of differentiations of power. Tvedt (1998,
p225) argues it is difficult to care for the other without invading the other. This is
relevant because when we act at a distance, those geographically far away from us are
vulnerable to our actions. Such new cross-cultural connections, amplified by
technology enabling rapid global communications, demand a new moral
accountability which is cognizant of and responsive to particular social and power
relations between donors and recipients.
6. Conclusions
Accountability of the North avoids social responsibility by denying culturally
determined legitimate meanings of value other than those constructed from an
economic perspective. This paper argues for a distinction between an economic
relationship and a gifting relationship between states of different stages of market
development. A gifting relationship is exemplified in the Live 8 and G 8 movements
because scarce resources are given anonymously and there is no possibility for
reciprocity from the recipients.
Accounting and its associated accountability is not neutral and objective in its
universal application. Rather it has emerged to privilege the lexicon of economic
exchange and is inculcated with assumptions of economic rationalism, demanding
equilibrium and reciprocity in value exchanges. The narrative of Live 8 and G 8
demonstrates a moral rather than a financial concept of accountability.
Both
movements, while well-intentioned, are inevitably compromised because they are
geopolitically situated in advanced capitalist states. Therefore, they must engage on a
financial basis that situates the donor in the same position as the investor in the
accounting calculus. This basis is ontologically singular and so does not permit
sufficient accountability to the recipients and the public interests as would be the case
if a wider sense of stewardship was enabled. Mechanisms for accountability are
couched in terms of market exchange and financial constructs of value. Accordingly,
such mechanisms do not provide accountability to recipients from donors.
Such a view is premised from the position of owing accountability purely in financial
terms to the individual or investor rather than a society. It is embedded with the
standard economic rationalist assumptions and contributes little to enhancing gifting
relationships across moral geographies. This paper argues for a broader form of
stewardship from each party to gifting relationships. The broader concept of
stewardship should be designed to better capture qualitative and cultural impacts from
the perspectives of both donors and recipients.
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A different accountability
The vision of accountability from a gifting perspective offers the following
possibilities. First, the accounting representation should not equate the donor with an
investor of capital, as the returns expected have both social and financial
characteristics. The donor should not be in the same place in the accounting calculus
as the investor. The broader concept of stewardship in line with the symbolic order or
feudal era of simulacra is supported. This would mean a use of qualitative social
impact statements, including justification for aid projects to avoid the “black
elephants” and make transparent the effectiveness of the aid. These impact statements
should be both from the donor and the recipient to achieve full disclosure. It is
suggested that the equity statement be expanded to differentiate and include a section
of social capital investment, including intergenerational investments in social capital.
To make visible the difference in power relations resulting from different stages of
economic strength, the development of a reciprocity statement will make visible the
social relations of any transactions. This makes transparent any self serving aid of a
donor.
The deficiencies of these suggestions are the limited ability to identify and reliably
measure social outcomes. The suggestions, while enhancing disclosure, do nothing to
solve the problems stemming from differing positions of political power from both the
recipient and donor perspectives. The suggestions also rely on considerable technical
development.
Northern attributes of accounting and accountability have been critiqued and found
wanting from the perspectives of gifting relationships and the public interest. Gifting
relationships rely on disequilibrium in exchange and more than quantitative
representations of value. All of these concepts are adopted from the perspective of the
North and have no ability to capture any qualitative forms of accountability. As such
they are simulacra for accountability and good governance but do not engage in an
authentic way with those in a donor/recipient relationship. A broader concept of
stewardship is forfeited to sustain the disequilibrium and maintain the power of the
economic elite.
Notes
1. MAKEPOVERTYHISTORY is an international coalition of aid agencies,
community groups and celebrities, who run a secular campaign for trade
justice and debt forgiveness.
2. The forty seven countries comprising the continent of Africa are Angola,
Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Congo D.R., Cote d’Ivoire,
Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana,
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and
Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan,
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
3. Live aid was a multi venue rock (London, Philadelphia, Sydney and Moscow)
concert held on 13 July 1985. It was broadcast via satellite to television
linkups with an estimated viewing audience of 1.5 billion people across 100
countries.
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4. North - Of or relating to the north; coming from the north; of a northern type
or character (Oxford English Dictionary). In this case the European economies
North of Africa.
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